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Introduction
Despite more than 40 years of studies of corporate dividend policies, questions such as whether potential dividend clienteles affect corporate payout decisions are largely unanswered. Even the existence of dividend clienteles is an unclear issue. Most earlier studies have focused on price and volume reactions around dividend events, and at best produced mixed indirect evidence on more permanent dividend clienteles. Recently, more direct evidence on the existence of dividend clienteles has been provided by studies of the holdings of either institutional investors as in Dhaliwal et al (1999) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) , of retail investors as in Graham and Kumar (2006) , or of half of an entire market as in Dahlquist et al (2006) . But do firms take clienteles into account, or is it mainly the investors who adjust through their portfolio choices? Pérez-Gonzales (2003) argue that the tax preferences of large shareholders influence dividend payout policies in the U.S. Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown et al (2007) offer support for the impact of owner and managerial / managerial incentives when setting the firm's dividend / payout policy around a tax reform. Contrarian results are provided by Brav et al (2005) , whose survey responses strongly indicate that firms are reluctant to change their dividend policies to reflect taxational changes which affect their major shareholders.
In this paper, we search for evidence on whether firms and / or investors adjust to changes in taxation (firms by changing their payout policy, owners by changing their portfolio allocations), i.e. we look at the interactions between these two. We do so by studying actual corporate dividend and share repurchase decisions around a major tax reform, on a market with varying, but on average substantially more concentrated ownership than in the U.S. Using financial and ownership data for listed firms, we find results contrary to the survey results by Brav et al (2005) , who indicate that firms would mainly not adjust their dividend policies, and to those of Brown et al (2007) , who found that individual ownership did not boost dividends while executive ownership did. We find significant evidence for firms (rather than investors) adjusting their payout levels both for dividends as well as for share repurchases, and that especially when dividends are concerned, firms take into account the taxation of large shareholders. We also find that payout variables are significant determinants for ownership structures in listed firms.
In Europe, share ownership is much more concentrated as compared to the U.S. Firms are therefore more likely to be dependent on some large, influential owners -and therefore more likely to adjust their dividend policies to reflect the preferences of such investors.
We study ownership and dividend policy changes around the Finnish tax reform of 2004, which radically changed the dividend preferences of taxed domestic investors. We contribute to the prior literature firstly by looking both at changes in payout policy (dividends and share repurchases) when controlling for ownership, and ownership when controlling for payout policy and its tax treatment, i.e. we aim to provide a study of the interactions between these two around a major tax reform. Secondly, we study a market with substantial variation in ownership concentration, which provides an opportunity to test whether firms are more likely to adjust their payout policies, when ownership is concentrated and more taxationally homogeneous. Thirdly, contrary to most studies of dividend clienteles, our payout policy variables include information on both dividends as well as share repurchases.
The structure of this report is as follows. In section 2, we discuss related literature. In section 3, we present the main features of the 2004 tax reform in Finland. In section 4, the data is presented. Empirical results are reported in section 5, and summary and conclusions are given in section 6. Allen and Michaely (2002) discuss two strands in tax-related dividend literature: static dividend models and dynamic trading models. Many papers offer support for dynamic tax-induced trading (abnormal volumes) around the ex-dividend day.
Literature review
1 If tax effects could entirely be eliminated by such trading, tax aspect might not at all influence actual portfolio holdings outside such dates. However, empirical evidence on ex-dividend price drops different from the size of the dividend indicate that this is not the case. 2 This leads to the question of whether dividends influence long-run portfolio investment strategies. In static dividend models, the focus is on the determinants of the stocks in a buy-and-hold portfolio strategy, i.e. the existence of dividend clienteles. Evidence for such clienteles can be either found by studying the determinants of individual portfolio holdings, firms' dividend policies, or changes (and interactions) in these.
Prior studies of either firms or investors actions include first of all studies of investors'
trading behavior around changes in dividend policy, such as dividend changes, initiations or omissions. In these studies (since the firm has already made its decision), the focus is mostly on whether the investors adjust. Weak or mixed evidence on investor adjustment around dividend events has been provided by Richardson et al (1986) , and Seida (2001) , as well as by Graham and Kumar (2006) . Binay (2001) in turn found significant changes in institutional ownership after dividend omissions and initiations. Looking at both institutional ownership and payout policy adjustments (both dividends as well as share repurchases) over a longer time period, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) provide a more thorough study of the interactions both ways in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996. They find that despite the result that institutional owners in the U.S. seem to prefer dividend-paying firms, the level of dividends does not matter, and so firms that increase their dividends do not attract significantly more institutional holdings. However, changes in the firm's repurchasing activity may affect institutional ownership in the same direction as the change. On the other hand, they found no evidence that an increase in 1 See e.g. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Michaely and Vila (1996) for the U.S., Kato and Lowenstein (1995) for Japan, and Michaely and Murgia (1995) for Italy. For a more detailed analysis of the identity of such traders, see e.g. Koski and Scruggs (1998) for the U.S., and Felixson and Liljeblom (2008) for Finland.
2 See e.g. Elton and Gruber (1970) , Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) , Green and Rydqvist (1999) , and Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003 One of their contribution is that by looking at share repurchases, they find evidence strongly suggesting a partial substitution between dividends and share repurchases.
Finally, Graham and Kumar (2006) studied retail investors' portfolio dividend yields (PDYs) around the tax reform of 1993. Although their main result was obtained using portfolio holdings (which only offers an indirect way to test who -the firm or the investor -reacts), a specification test looking at purchases gives qualitatively similar (albeit weaker) results, indicating that the result is at least partly based on investors rather than firms adjusting.
In summary, the evidence on firm's actually adjusting their payout levels is scarce especially outside the U.S. There are also not many studies of the simultaneous reactions of the firms (their payout decisions) on one hand, and the investors' choices (to enter or exit based on dividends as one argument for stock selection) on the other hand, since it is difficult to study such interactions during periods of stable dividend policies and tax regimes. Understanding the interactions is however important for the firms when tailoring their payout policies. Also, studies of such interactions may help e.g. in understanding potential capital flows in and out of specific stocks.
Finland's 2004 Tax Reform
The taxation of dividends and corporate profits changed substantially when a tax reform bill became effective in January 2005 in Finland. Since 1993, the time of the previous major reform, all capital income and corporate profits were taxed at a single flat rate, which first was 25% (in 1993), and then successively raised to 28% (in 1996) , and further to 29% (in 2000) . Furthermore, a full imputation (avoir fiscal) system was applied to the taxation of distributed corporate profits (dividends), which effectively made dividends tax-free at the personal level. The 2004 reform changed both the tax rates applied at the corporate and personal income level and more importantly replaced the full imputation system by a partial double taxation.
After the reform, the corporate profits tax rate was lowered from 29% to 26% and the capital income tax-rate from 29% to 28%. The abandoning of the full imputation system and the introduction of a partial double taxation introduced the capital income tax also for 70% of the dividends received (57%, during the adjustment period of 2005). Therefore, the effective tax-rate on dividends after the reform is 19.6% (0.7 times 0.28) and 15.96%
(0.57 times 0.28) during the adjustment year of 2005, while it as a result of the full imputation was zero before the reform. The reform treats dividends received from a unlisted firm differently from a listed one, and these dividends are tax free up to a limit of 90 000 euros per physical recipient. Also for unlisted firms, dividends exceeding 90 000 euros are taxed according to the main rule. However, for listed equities that are our main interest in this study, dividends are always taxed at the personal level. repurchases versus dividends has been analyzed in Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) . We include share repurchases also in this study, and hence not only study potential changes in cash dividend policies, but also in the companies' share repurchasing activity.
The Data

The sample
The dividend data is obtained from final sample size is slightly reduced due to some missing data points and delistings, and the final full sample consists of 524 firm-year observations for 148 firms. We further loose some observations when we use the lagged dividend payout ratio as an explanatory variable, and when we restrict the analysis to less extreme payout ratios due to small divisor, leading to a sample size of 468 for the main dividend regression. To avoid a larger fallout we use a substitution method to replace missing data points for our control variables (firm characteristics). In the substitution method a missing data point is replaced by the year average for the data item. As mentioned this method is only used in a few cases and for the control variables only, and we are confident that the potential bias introduced is small or negligible.
Dependent variables
Our main focus is in the interaction between payout levels around the tax reform, and firm ownership / potential ownership changes. We perform panel regressions both separately for dividend payouts and share repurchases, and also simultaneous equations for dividends, share repurchases, and ownership. In the panel regressions, we use the dividend payout ratio (total dividends per share / earnings per share) for cash dividends, and measure share repurchasing activity by share repurchases to total payable equity (free equity 
Control variables
Our control variables for the payout regressions include first of all variables related to traditional determinants for corporate payout policy, i.e. variables proxying for the signaling and agency cost motives.
The signaling motive can be expected to be stronger if the firm is perceived to be undervalued by its insiders. We therefore include the Past 6 month Return (the past stock return) as well as the Market-to-Book variable. In both payout models (for dividends as well as for share repurchases), also ROA as a profitability measure is naturally included (in the dividend model, as a part of the Basic model). If payouts are used to signal future (or current) profitability, there may be a positive association between these variables and our payout variables.
The Free Cash Flow variable, measured as EBIT plus depreciation and amortization expenses over sales, is included to test for a tendency for higher payouts in firms with a higher free cash flow, in order to reduce potential agency costs in line with Jensen (1986).
Earlier empirical results for the Finnish market (see e.g. Liljeblom and Pasternack 2006) show that for share repurchases, foreign ownership seems to be the single most important explanatory variable, one potential reason being that the withholding tax of typically 15% on dividends to foreigners puts an additional burden on dividends as compared to share repurchases. We therefore include Foreign Ownership as one explanatory variable in the share repurchase equation, and, for symmetry, also in one specification for the dividend model.
Finally, we include some traditional control variables in the dividend and share repurchase models. Since larger and more mature firms may have more established payout policies, and also larger levels due to smaller growth opportunities, we include
Size measured as the logarithm of sales. Since financially constrained firms may have lower payout levels, we also include Leverage defined as total long-term debt to total assets.
The model where the ownership by the taxationally affected owners acts as a dependent variable is somewhat different from the previous two models. Studies of cross-sectional ownership patterns, mainly ownership concentration, often follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , who provide evidence of the endogeneity of corporate ownership. They use size, control potential, operationalized by different risk measures, and regulation, captured by dummies for certain industries, as explanatory variables for ownership concentration in the U.S. Similar variables are later used e.g. by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , where they also included leverage and firm performance.
We will start with a model similar to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , but excluding firm specific risk, which was not significant in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and is likewise not expected to explain private ownership at least with a negative sign in Finland, where many of the small (and family controlled) firms are within or related to the IT-sector.
We include Size, measured as the logarithm of sales, to capture the fact that with restricted wealth, taxationally affected ownership (to a large part private) can hardly be that large in very large firms. Following Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we also include
Leverage defined as total long-term debt to total assets. Leverage was a significant determinant with a negative sign in their study, and they argued that if creditors do add to the monitoring capability of a firm, their presence may discourage attempts by management to entrench through share ownership. Our dependent variable is not management ownership, but if control by creditors may be a substitute for private control, a negative sign may be expected also in our model specification. Since family ownership has been observed to be related to higher profitability and firm valuation (see e.g. 
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for our main variables as well as for some alternative specifications of the payout and profitability variables are reported in Table 2 , both for the full sample as well as for two subsamples (firms with a below or above median percentage of taxationally affected large owners). The table shows that the time period has been one of high dividends, with mean payout ratios of 1.4 and a mean dividend yield of 4.54%. The ownership by the taxationally affected top 5 owners amounts to approximately 55% of the total ownership by the five largest owners, with substantial variation (averages of 21% and 88% in the two subgroups). Out of the total equity of the firm, these taxationally affected large owners own on average 25%, i.e. ownership is highly concentrated, Foreign ownership is on average at 18%, with variation between the MIN and MAX values of zero and 93%.
Empirical analysis
The development of in dividend payouts, dividend yields, and share repurchases is reported in Table 3 , separately for two groups of firms: firms where the percentage of taxationally affected owners ownership of equity is less than 30% of the aggregated equity owned by the 5 largest shareholders (where our Taxed of 5 Largest Shareholders variable takes a value lesss than 30%), and for the rest of the firms. The cut-off point of 30% for the ownership variable is arbitrarily drawn in order to identify some level of reasonably large influence by the tax-affected owners. Since the dividend payout variable is highly positively skewed, exhibiting some extreme values due to small denominators (high dividends despite a small EPS), we have first of all truncated it at the level of 10. In Table 3 , Panel A, we report dividend payout ratios for the full (truncated) sample, as well as for a restricted sample, where payouts higher than 8 have been excluded. 4 Key statistics are also illustrated in Figure 1 .
The table and Figure 1 illustrate several interesting features. First, we see many indications of higher initial dividends (in 2002) in the group with more tax-affected owners: a higher median payout (despite an insignificantly smaller average) for the full sample, higher mean and median payouts in the restricted sample, and a substantially higher dividend yield. The difference in dividend yields (5.57% versus 3.7%) is significant at the 5% level (with a t-values of 2.28). This is in line with our prior expectations: the tax-affected owners are largely individual owners, and private owners are typically observed to prefer dividends (Dong et al (2003) , Graham and Kumar (2004) the all three equations, in order to test whether it is the firm only, or also the owners, who adjust. The estimated models, and the obtained results, are in more detail discussed below.
Results for the dividend payout
Most empirical tests on dividends or cash distribution are based on Lintner's (1956) early and highly influential work. Lintner's partial adjustment model assumes that dividends include signals regarding the quality of the firm's earnings, and that firms use stable pay-out ratios and are very reluctant to lower these ratios. As a result, dividend policy is not changed until managers can see that new earnings levels are sustainable. In the partial adjustment model, the change in dividend is explained by the prior dividend and the current profit (both expected to receive positive coefficients) and a positive constant term (to catch the empirical observation that firms in general are reluctant to reduce dividends).
We base our cross sectional analysis of changes in dividend payout ratios around the 2004 tax reform on an application of the Lintner's model. In the most basic test (Displayed in Table 4 , Panel A.) we do this by regressing the current dividend payout ratio on the lagged payout ratio and the firm's return on assets i.e. ROA. We find that dividend payout ratios in our sample are, as expected, positively and highly significantly related to prior payout ratios and the firm profit (as proxied by ROA). We also find a significant positive constant term as predicted by Lintner.
We we also include in the basic dividend model the tax variables described above, and a number of control variables that are used to control for variation in the cross-section. In order to exclude extreme outliers in the dependent variable, the sample is restricted to include firm-years where the dividend payout ratio is less than 8. We expect that firms would 1.) pay out higher dividends prior to the reform, 2.) pay out lower dividends after the reform, and 3.) that this behaviour would be especially markedly present in firms with shareholders suffering from the reform (i.e. we expect a positive coefficient for the dividend interaction variable).
The results of these analyzes are displayed in Table 4 However, only size and Free Cash Flow are significant at the 10% level.
In summary, the results displayed in Table 4 indicate that Finnish listed firms clearly adjusted their dividend payout ratios around the 2004 tax reform, and that the tax clienteles had an effect on this adjustment.
Results for share repurchases
To further test the changes in cash distribution around the 2004 tax reform, we analyse share repurchases for the two-year period before and after the tax reform. This is executed by regressing the share repurchases on dummy variables for the different years, variables measuring the effect of tax clienteles and finally on a number of control variables designed to capture motives for share repurchases as well as to control for cross-sectional variation in distribution policy. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5 for the full sample. As shown by the results in Table 5 , we find that in general firms do more share repurchases during the latter part of the investigated period, as compared to the base year , and we interpret that this as a signal of a switch in payout policy, from dividends to share repurchases, after the tax reform. However, as shown in Table 5 , we fail to find any evidence of a tax clientele effect regarding the share repurchases around the 2004 tax reform (insignificant ownership and interaction variables).
Again, our control variables mainly obtain the expected signs, with the exception of the the insignificant Market-to-Book variable. Again, Size is significant in one specification, and also the Foreign Ownership variable, once inluded, in line with earlier findings for share repurchases on the Finnish market.
Ownership and payouts
Next, we study the endogeneity of ownership by the taxationally affected owners, and to what degree that is dependent of the firm's dividend policy. We estimate the ownership equation both with and without share repurchases, since we a cautious of the reasonably high correlations between share repurchases and foreign ownership (a positive correlation of 0.23) on one hand, and the negative correlation between Taxed of 5 Largest Shareholders and Foreign Ownership (a negative correlation of -0.34), making share repurchases as one kind of proxy for internationalized firms with ownership by others than the taxationally affected owners. 7 The results for the ownership model are reported in Table 6 .
The results in Table 6 show that Size, Leverage, and Market-to-Book significantly explain ownership by the taxationally affected owners, with the expected signs (a negative one for the first two, and a positive for Market-to-Book), while ROA is insignificant. Of the payout variables, only share repurchases is significant in specification 1 (Panel A), but when two quite insignificant variables are dropped, Pay-Out Ratio is significant at the 1% level with a positive sign. When share repurchases is dropped (due to its strong negative relationship to Foreign Owners), the significance of Pay-Out Ratio is further increased.
None of the interaction terms are significant, but the interaction dummy for Pay-Out
Ratio has an expected sign (we expected a lower interest in dividends after the tax reform).
5.4.Testing for interactions: results from 3SLS
7 Hence part of the explanatory power of share repurchases may come just out of the fact that they are more common in firms with large foreign ownership (driven by the preferences of such owners), and in such firms, private ownership is already at a low level (was often so even before open market share repurchases became possible in Finland).
To further test the causality of changes in distribution policy, i.e. to which extent not only firms but also owners adjust, we use simultaneous estimation (3SLS) to regress a equation system where the explanatory variables are: 1) the dividend Pay-Out Ratio ( Tables 4, 5 and 6. The results especially for the dividend Pay-Out Ratio are surprisingly similar to the stand alone analysis, and give even stronger support for the fact that firms both decrease their dividend payout in general after the tax reform, and that the adjustment is dependent on the tax clientele. In the simultaneous analysis, the multiplicative dummy for the taxed owners for the last year before the reform shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between this variable and the dividend payout, indicating that firms with more owners affected by the reform paid out even more dividend prior to the tax reform.
Results in Panel B show that the owners affected by the tax reform (mainly private owners) populate firms with above average dividend payout ratio and a high market-tobook ratio. The result is especially strong for the payout ratio (a z-statistic in excess of 4), this variable being the single most significant determinant for ownership clienteles, and this result is in line with international evidence on individuals preferring dividends (e.g. Based on the simultaneous analysis it seems that firms adjust dividends around the tax reform, taking into account the tax clienteles of their shareholders. We also find evidence suggesting that payout policy is an important determinant for ownership. The interaction between these will further be studied in robustness tests in the next section.
5.4.Robustness tests
We perform several types of robustness tests. First, we rerun the dividend and share repurchase models using a random effects model. The results are largely in line with those reported in tables 4 to 5, and e.g. our Taxed These results are reported in column 3 in Table 8 , and are in line with the previous, albeit with lower significance for the year dummies in the full dividend model, now when the sample size is reduced to 328 firm-year observations. Table 6 . Now the interaction variable for dividends is significant in all cases, with a negative coefficient sign larger in absolute terms than the positive one for Pay-Out Ratio, indicating that the preference for dividends hardly would exist after the tax reform. These results for the coefficients also hold when these model specifications are estimated without the share repurchase variable (with may proxy for foreign ownership). small payout ratio increases, the relationship between ownership changes and payout ratio increases is positive and significant for the 42 payout ratio increases in excess of 15% (a t-value of 1.78). In the first year after the reform, the relationship between ownership changes and payout is negative but insignificant. The same holds if the ownership change is measured e.g. by the change in the taxationally affected large owners plus the total domestic free float. In summary, we do not find strong evidence on owners changing their holdings.
12 Again excluding extreme observations for the Pay-Out Ratio.
Summary and Conclusion
Tax regime changes offer excellent opportunities to study how firms as well as investors react. We provide evidence on changes in dividend and well as share repurchase policies, as well as changes in large portfolio holdings, around a major dividend tax reform in Finland in 2004. Controlling for ownership by large owners affected by the tax reform (holding on average 54.6% of the shares owned by the 5 largest owners, and 25% of total equity, with a large cross-sectional variation from 0% to 100%), we find that firms increased dividends the last year when dividends still were untaxed at the investor level (in advance of the known tax reform), significantly more so in firms with more taxationally affected large owners. After the reform, there is a highly significant decline in dividends across all firms. The dividend preferences of the owners affected by the tax reform are weaker after the reform, as indicated by both a convergence in payout ratios across firms, as well as by a significant negative dividend interaction term in our ownership equation (in the specification tests), of a magnitude cancelling the coefficient for dividend preference. We also find a significant increase in share repurchases after the reform, and some convergence in repurchasing activity, although here the interaction term still indicates a difference between the two groups of owners.
We also provide evidence on the determinants of ownership, and ownership changes.
Payout policy variables also appear as significant determinants to ownership shares of the taxationally affected large owners. However, while firms react to the tax reform, we do not find significant evidence of investors doing so. Only in firms with extreme dividends, did the change in taxationally affected owners show a weakly significant, positive correlation with the dividend change. Table 6 . Ownership regressions 
